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INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA)1 marked the first occasion in which Congress mandated procedures for the Executive to follow while conducting
electronic surveillance of foreign powers or their agents for foreign intelligence purposes.2 From 1940 until the Watergate scan1. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. IV. 1980).
2. FISA was several years in the making. The 1978 hearings were the sixth
attempt in as many years to limit the Executive's power to conduct surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes. See S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7,

reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3904, 3908. The court in United
States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 & n.12 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), listed four of
these pre-FISA legislative efforts. In 1941 Congress considered prohibiting exec-
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dal, Presidents actively conducted warrantless national security
surveillance for nonevidentiary purposes in a controversial exercise of their foreign affairs power.4 FISA was created to protect
individual rights by requiring judicial approval prior to initiation
of foreign intelligence surveillance while at the same time allowing enough procedural flexibility for effective intelligence
gathering. 5 Procedures were also built into FISA for the evidentiary use of information gathered and for nondisclosure of information which threatens national security.6
Although FISA for the first time subjects the Executive to statutory restraints in conducting domestic national security surveillance,7 defendants in United States v. Falvey' and United States
v. Belfield9 argued that FISA's requirements do not provide the
minimum protection afforded individuals by the Constitution.
The Falvey and Belfield opinions, the first in which FISA's constitutionality is considered, uphold FISA against fifth and sixth
amendment challenges. The court in Falvey also upholds FISA
against challenges under the first and fourth amendments.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

Electronic Surveillance by the Executive-The National
Security Exception

Since 1940 United States presidents have exercised their executive power to authorize electronic surveillance in the interest of
national security.10 Although Congress declared electronic surveilutive surveillance for nonevidentiary purposes but did not do so. Shapiro, The
ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Act: Legislative Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 119, 129 (1977); see also
infra note 10 (prior legislative effort to prohibit wiretapping) and note 15 (Congress' refusal to amend the Federal Communications Act of 1934).
3. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 30-38.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 108-112.
7. FISA does not subject any surveillances outside of the United States to
prior judicial review. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f).
8. 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
9. 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
10. Electronic surveillance reportedly has existed since the invention of the
telegraph. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 45 (1967).

Federal agents from the Bureau of Prohibition used electronic eavesdropping
during the 1920s as a means of policing the National Prohibition Act. See Olin-
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lance illegal in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (FCA), 11
fourth amendment restraints were not considered applicabl to
electronic surveillance1 2 until 1967.13 Even though the Supreme
Court in 1937 held that the FCA applied to federal officers 14 as
well as to private individuals, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
1940 issued a memorandum to his Attorney General 5 authorizing
electronic surveillance of persons suspected of subversive activities, stating his belief that such surveillance would be constitutional in "grave matters involving the defense of the nation."1
Roosevelt, however, requested the Attorney General to keep the
surveillances to a minimum and to limit them "insofar as possible
to aliens.' 17 Subsequent Presidents have followed Roosevelt's prestead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 483 & n.15 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(agents' wiretapping upheld although the Attorney General disclaimed responsibility for its authorization).
The Executive's power is derived from article II of the Constitution, which has
been interpreted as giving the President broad power over the conduct of foreign
affairs. E.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602-03 & nn.35-40 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). See generally Shapiro, supra note 2, at
122-23 n.11, 142-43; Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a JudicialRole in National Security Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1116,
1137-39 (1980). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 619-27 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
11. Pub. L. No. 19-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 47 U.S.C.). Section 605 of 47 U.S.C. provides that no person not
authorized by the sender shall intercept or divulge the contents of an electronic
message.

12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding fourth amendment protections do not extend to wiretapping when no physical trespass has
occurred).
13. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead and held that electronic surveillance was subject to fourth
amendment standards. Id. at 358.
14. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (47 U.S.C. § 605 applied to federal agents and evidence obtained from the interception of electronic
communications was inadmissable in court).
15. Memorandum from President Franklin Roosevelt for the Attorney General (May 21, 1940) [hereinafter cited as F.D.R. Memo] reprinted in Zweibon,
516 F.2d at 673-74. Roosevelt's memorandum was written in reaction to Nardone. Interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 605 as not prohibiting dissemination within the
government for law enforcement ends, the Justice Department decided to continue electronic surveillance for nonevidentiary purposes. Congress' subsequent
decision not to amend § 605 became a part of the justification for continued
electronic surveillance by the government. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 128-29.
16. S. REP. No. 604, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted at 3911.
17. F.D.R. Memo, supra note 15, reprintedin Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 673-74.
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cedent,' s using the resulting information for nonevidentiary purposes, but steadily expanding the scope of information gathered. 19
In 1966 President Johnson's Solicitor General revealed that surveillances had extended to concerns generated by domestic as
well as foreign threats to national security.2" One year later in
Katz v. United States,2" the Supreme Court held that fourth
amendment protections did apply to electronic surveillance, 2 but
left unsettled whether the warrant requirement extended to national security wiretappings.25
In the same year as Katz, the first attempt by a state to establish statutory procedures for electronic surveillance was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In Berger v. New York 24 the
Court found the broad language of the New York statute violative
of fourth and fourteenth amendment rights.2 5 Adhering carefully

18. The only known break in continued electronic surveillance occurred from
February 1952 to May 1954 when Attorney General J. Howard McGrath told the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that he would not authorize the installation of surveillance microphones by trespass. S. REP. No. 604, supra note 2, at
11, reprinted at 3912; see Shapiro, supra note 2, at 131.
19. President Truman expanded the scope of electronic surveillance to include allegedly subversive domestic activities after a memorandum from Attorney General Tom Clark quoted the F.D.R. Memo, supra note 15, but omitted
President Roosevelt's "insofar as possible to aliens" limitation. Memorandum
from Attorney General Tom Clark to President Harry Truman (July 17, 1946),
reprinted in Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 674. Under Herbert Hoover, the FBI expanded its surveillances during the 1950s and early 1960s to encompass any activity considered against the "national interest," including activities of suspected communists and suspected organized crime figures. S. REP. No. 604,
supra note 2, at 11, reprinted at 3912-13.
20. These revelations were made in an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme
Court in Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966), quoted in S. REP. No. 604,
supra note 2, at 11-12, reprintedat 3913. President Johnson earlier had moved
to restrict broad surveillance practices. Memorandum from Lyndon B. Johnson
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (June 30, 1965), reprinted in Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 674-75.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. Id. at 512.
23. Id. at 358 n.23. Justice White's concurrence expressly agreed with the
majority's refusal to include national security wiretapping within its holding. Id.
at 363-64 (White, J., concurring). Justice Douglas in his concurrence speaks
against a national security exception. Id. at 359-60.
24. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
25. Id. at 44. The Court found that the statutory language did not articulate
with sufficient particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Id. at 55-56. In an amicus curiae brief, the American Civil Liberties Union
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to standards articulated by the Court in Katz and Berger, Congress one year later passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act; 26 Title

11127

of that act establishes procedures for ob-

taining warrants for electronic surveillance in the course of criminal investigations. 28 Title III, however, also avoided the issue of
national security wiretapping and specifically excluded from its
warrant requirement surveillance undertaken by the Executive to
protect the Government from domestic and foreign threats.2 For
the next decade courts struggled to define the scope of the "national security exception."
During the decade between Title III and FISA the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the national security exception only
once, in United States v. United States District Court (Keith),30
holding that electronic surveillance of domestic organizations,
even when conducted in the interest of national security, was subject to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.3 1 The Court
refused to interpret Title III's national security exception as
granting the Executive the power to conduct warrantless wiretaps.3

2

The Court recognized, however, the need for standards

and procedures more flexible than those of Title III, which would
be appropriate for domestic intelligence surveillance aimed at
preventing activities dangerous to the Government. 3 The Court
then suggested that Congress develop such standards as "may be
(ACLU) raised first and fifth amendment arguments. See Goldsmith, Supreme
Court and Title III: Rejecting the Law of Electronic Surveillance,section IV, to
be published in 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983).
26. Pub. L. No. 90-351 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2515-20 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a comprehensive discussion of Title III, see Goldsmith, supra note 25.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (authorization for interception); id. § 2518 (procedure
for interception). Title III was upheld as meeting the constitutional standards
established in Berger and Katz in United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (repealed 1978) (nothing contained in Title III or 47
U.S.C. § 605 shall limit the constitutional power of the President to conduct
electronic surveillance if the surveillance is deemed essential to national security). S. REP. No. 604, supra note 2, at 7, reprinted at 3908.
30. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) ("Weathermen" charged with conspiring to dynamite
Ann Arbor office of the Central Intelligence Agency).
31. Id. at 409.
32. Id. at 321-22.
33. Id. at 322.
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compatible with the fourth amendment if they are reasonable
both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. 3 4 Although Keith specifically excepted intelligence surveillance involving foreign powers from its discussion, 5 Congress eventually
used Keith's directives in FISA36 to mandate "less precise" warrant procedures 37 for foreign intelligence surveillance carried out
in this country. 8
After Keith but before FISA, four circuit courts of appeals considered the constitutionality of the national security exception
and its application to foreign intelligence surveillance. The Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Buck 9 accepted without analysis that
"[f]oreign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general warrant requirement."4 The Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Brown41 recognized the President's "inherent power to protect
national security in the context of foreign affairs

'42

and held legal

a warrantless wiretap authorized by the President.43 The Third
Circuit in United States v. Butenko,"4 although rejecting the Supreme Court's abandonment of traditional fourth amendment
analysis for intelligence surveillance,45 concluded that warrants
were not an absolute prerequisite in the foreign intelligence
field.4 6 The Butenko court held legal a warrantless surveillance on
the grounds that it was "solely for the purpose" of gathering foreign intelligence information. 47 At the peak of the post-Watergate
34. Id. at 322-23.
35. Id. at 321-22.
36. Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes:Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and
the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., 77-78 (1976) (statement by Attorney General Edward H. Levi)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 3197].
37. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
38. Hearings on S. 3197, supra note 36, at 77-78.
39. 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).

40. Id. at 875.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
Id. at 426.
Id.
494 F.2d 593.
Id. at 603.

46. Id. at 605.
47.

Id. at 606.
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controversy," the court in Zweibon v. Mitchell4 9 clearly rejected
the national security exception. After discussing four rationales
for exempting the Executive from the traditional fourth amendment warrant requirement, 50 Judge J. Skelly Wright held none
sufficiently compelling to entitle the Executive to surveil domestic
organizations without a Title III warrant, even when foreign affairs are involved. 5 1 Although he indicated strong reservations,
Wright did not entirely rule out warrantless wiretapping if the
target was a foreign agent or was collaborating with a foreign
power.5 2
In a decision rendered since FISA but not governed by it,
United States v. Truong,53 the Fourth Circuit upheld the power
of the Executive to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance so
long as the purpose of the surveillance remained primarily foreign intelligence information. 4 Because the surveillance in
Truong developed into a primarily criminal investigation,5 5 the
5
Court held inadmissable the evidence seized after that shift. "
The Court reasoned that judges have the expertise to make probable cause determinations in criminal cases but do not have the
same expertise in military and diplomatic matters. 5 In a footnote

48. In the aftermath of Watergate, other abuses of the national security exception were exposed. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and the Rights of
Americans, the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 183315 (1978) (appendices D & E, findings of the Church Committee) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 1566].
49. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Zweibon was a damage action brought by
16 members of the Jewish Defense League against the Attorney General and
nine FBI agents for bugging the organization's New York headquarters. Id. at
600. Judge Wright's monumental opinion is written in the atmosphere of public
concern about possible Executive violations of the fourth amendment.
50. The four rationales for the exception were lack of judicial competence,
security leaks, delay, and the administrative burden imposed. Id. at 641-51.
51. Id. at 655.
52. Id. at 614. Judge Wilkey's part concurrence, part dissent also allowed for
a possible "foreign affairs exemption" in a "narrow category of wiretaps." Id. at
689.
53. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982). Truong
and Ronald Humphrey were convicted of conspiracy and espionage for transmitting classified government information to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Hearings on S. 3197, supra note 36 at 911.
54. Id. at 916.
55. Id. Specific memoranda indicated the shift in emphasis. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 915.
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the Court commented approvingly on FISA's attempt to balance
the roles of the judiciary and the executive in order to accommodate the different expertise of each and the different nature of
foreign intelligence surveillance. 58
The Falvey court considers both the national security exception
and the constitutionality of FISA's warrant requirement. Falvey
also considers whether FISA's language is overbroad and a violation of the defendants' first amendment rights.
B.

In Camera, Ex Parte Proceedings

Both Title III and FISA provide for the use of surveillance evidence in criminal proceedings.5 9 Title III requires disclosure of
the surveillance application and order before the evidence may be
used;6 0 FISA makes disclosure discretionary. 1 If the legality of
the surveillance is challenged, Title III provides for an adversary
hearing, 2 while FISA dictates an in camera, ex parte determination when national security interests are declared in danger.6 3
The Supreme Court held that the proceeding in United States
v. Alderman64 inadequately protected the defendants' rights because determining the relevance of an illegal surveillance was too
complex a task for an in camera, ex parte determination. In
6 6 however, the Court stated that the
United States v. Giordano,
legality of an electronic surveillance may be determined in an in
camera, ex parte proceeding.6 In United States v. Taglianetti68
the Court held that a simple task, the verification of a voice identification,6 9 may be performed by a judge in a closed, nonadversary proceeding because the defendant's fourth amendment rights

58. Id. at 914 n.4.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2517, 2518 (9)(10); 50 U.S.C. § 1806.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(9).
50 U.S.C. § 1806(0.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(10).
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).
394 U.S. 165 (1969).

65. Id. at 192.

66. 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
67. Id, at 314. "We have nowhere stated that [the preliminary determination
of legality] cannot appropriately be made in ex parte, in camera proceedings."

Id.
68. 394 U.S. 316 (1969).
69. Id. at 317.
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were not jeopardized.7 0 The Third Circuit upheld an in camera,
ex parte determination of the legality of an electronic surveillance in Butenko,7 1 but refused disclosure after weighing the necessity of an adversary proceeding to protect the defendant's
rights against the Government's strong national security interest
in preventing disclosure.7 2 Closed pretrial admissibility proceedings generally have been upheld 3 when (1) there is a strong Government interest in doing so," (2) the matter to be decided is
relatively uncomplicated,7 5 and (3) the judge's determination affects the outcome of the trial only indirectly or remotely.7 6 Conversely, in camera, ex parte proceedings have not been upheld
when (1) the complexity of a trial judge's determination requires
an adversary presence to promote its accuracy77 and (2) the trial
70. Id. "Adversary proceedings were required only because in camera proceedings in those cases would have been an inadequate means to safeguard
[f]ourth [a]mendment rights." Id.
71. 494 F.2d at 607.
72. Id.
73. E.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (trial judge may
make in camera, ex parte determination after a specific request from the defense whether information withheld by the prosecution was material); Palermo
v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959) (trial judge may make in camera, ex
parte determination of whether Government may withhold documents under
the "Jencks" Act). United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (19 ) (in camera, ex parte determination of the
reliability of informants upheld); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 707 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978) (trial court may make an in camera,
ex parte determination of whether disclosing tape recordings of defendant's
voice was required under FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)).
74. E.g., Palermo, 360 U.S. at 354 (Government may withhold defendant's
access to internal documents); Pelton, 578 F.2d at 709 (Government concerned
with informants' safety; Butenko, 494 F.2d at 607 (Government seeks to protect
information on the Strategic Air Command).
75. E.g., Taglianetti, 394 U.S. at 318 (trial court asked to identify defendant's voice); Butenko, 494 F.2d at 607 (determining legality of wiretap was not
so complex as to require adversary hearing).
76. E.g., Manley, 632 F.2d at 985 (question of reliability of informants "light
years" away from question on guilt or innocence); Pelton, 578 F.2d at 707 (upheld in camera, ex parte determination in part because no showing by defendant that her substantial rights were prejudiced); Brown, 484 F.2d at 425 (upheld in camera, ex parte determination of legality of wiretaps because
conversations contained nothing relevant to the defendant's case); United States
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1972) (testimony in in camera, ex parte hearing on hijacker profile bore no relationship to defendant's guilt or innocence).
77. E.g., Alderman, 394 U.S. at 192; Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855,
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judge's determination could be crucial to the outcome of the
case.7 8
Underlying each decision upholding an in camera, ex parte determination are constitutional concerns about the defendant's
sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses testifying
against him and his right to counsel-essential components of the
fifth amendment right to due process. Implicit in the FISA provision is congressional recognition that if the Government refuses
to allow enough disclosure "to make an accurate determination of
legality," the Government must forego using the evidence or cease
to prosecute the defendant. 79 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Ajlouny,80 noting the conflict among
courts concerning the adequacy of in camera, ex parte proceedings, 81 held lawful a closed pretrial surveillance suppression hearing because its scope was limited and neither disclosure nor an
adversary hearing would have materially advanced the accurate
resolution of the factual issues.82 In camera, ex parte hearings
may also run counter to the sixth amendment right to a public
trial,' but because that right exists primarily for the purpose of
873-75 (1966) (reversing a decision allowing the trial judge to examine in camera, ex parte grand jury testimony to determine what material could be used to
impeach Government witnesses); United States v. Manuszak, 438 F. Supp. 613,
624-25 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
78. E.g., Manley, 632 F.2d at 985 (disclosure of informers' identities would
be deemed appropriate if the information supplied by them constitutes the bulk
of the evidence and is uncorroborated); United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 245
(1973) (pretrial decision to suppress is often as important as trial itself, thus
defendant should have been present); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1088-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (not only defendant's attorney but defendant must be
present during in camera, ex parte suppression hearings if his presence could
have been helpful).
79. S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3973, 4015-16.
80. 629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1982). Defendant was convicted of transporting stolen property in foreign commerce, after
defrauding the phone company in making overseas phone calls to the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Id. at 832-33. In the course of the investigation, his
phone calls were intercepted. Id.
81. Id. at 839 & n.12.
82. Id. The hearing was closed in the interests of national security and the
surveillance statements were not directly related to the indictment, nor had they
been used to initiate the criminal proceedings. Id. at 838.
83. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 429 (1979) (Justice Marshall
dissented from the majority's ruling that the public could be excluded from a
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protecting the defendant from prosecutorial and judicial abuses,84
courts have traditionally -allowed closed trials if publicity would
adversely affect the defendant 5 or is against the public interest.8
Courts have also held that the right to a public trial does not
necessarily extend to pretrial proceedings.8 7 Public disclosure in
FISA suppression hearings could be detrimental to the Government and to the public interest by revealing national security information and could also adversely affect the defendant by publicizing extensive incriminating conversations.
Both the Falvey and the Belfield decisions consider the constitutionality of FISA's in camera, ex parte procedures. In Falvey
defendants were provided limited disclosure of the surveillances
used by the prosecution; in Belfield defendants were refused any
disclosure of conversations used not as evidence against them, but
as part of an in camera exhibit.
C. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
FISA eliminates the national security exception of Title II8 by
providing statutory procedures for all foreign intelligence electronic surveillance carried on within the United States. 9 FISA
recognizes no "inherent power" of the President to conduct national security surveillance and is based on the proposition that
even if such a power exists, Congress may regulate its use.90
pretrial suppression hearing after the defendants claimed that the adverse publicity would keep them from receiving a fair trial); see also United States v.

Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978).
84. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379; Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 850.
85. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 376-78.
86. Id. at 378; Bell, 464 F.2d at 669 (upholding exclusion of the defendant
and the public from that portion of a hearing dealing with a hijacker's profile);
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1088 (danger to public in revealing hijacker profile justifies exclusion of public from suppression hearing).
87. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 394-96 (Burger, C.J., concurring). But see id. at

436-37 (Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., and White, J., dissenting);
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 848-50.
88. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Section 2511(3), title 18 of the
United States Code was repealed and replaced with § 2511(2)(d)-(f) to eliminate
completely the national security exception. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(d)-(f); see also
S. REP. No. 604, supra note 2, at 63, reprinted at 3965.
89. See supra note 7. FISA and title DI together now mandate warrant procedures for all domestic wiretapping. S. REP. No. 604, supra note 2, at 6, re-

printed at 3907.
90. Id. at 16, reprinted at 3917.
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FISA's authorization procedure 9 ' is three-tiered. First, the President must authorize the Attorney General to approve applications
for electronic surveillance. 2 Second, the application by a federal
officer must be approved by the Attorney General. 93 Last, a specially appointed FISA judge94 must find, on the basis of facts submitted by the applicant, 95 that there is probable cause to believe
that the proposed target of the surveillance is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power. 98 The FISA definition of an "agent of
a foreign power" includes a person who knowingly engages in or
prepares for engaging in international terrorist activities on behalf of a foreign power.9 7 Those activities must involve dangerous
or violent acts which are or which would be a violation of state or
federal criminal law."" If the application meets the above-stated
requirements, contains all of the necessary statements and certifications,09 and if the proposed minimization procedures are satisfactory, 100 then the FISA judge must authorize the surveillance.101
If the target of the surveillance is a "United States person, 10 2
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1805.
92. Id. at § 1805(a)(1).
93. Id. at 1805(a)(2).
94. Id. at § 1803. Under FISA the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is
directed to designate seven district court judges to act as a FISA court to hear
applications and grant orders under that act. Id.
95. See id. § 1804(a)(3)-(11) (explaining the information required).
96. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A). The FISA judge must also find probable cause to
believe that the proposed site of the surveillance is presently being used or is
about to be used by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Id. §
1805(a)(3)(B).
97. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(C). The knowledge requirement was added in response
to concern that the FISA surveillance could be authorized for someone who unknowingly aided those involved in terrorist activities. S. REP. No. 701, supra
note 79, at 26-27, reprinted at 3995-96; S.REP. No. 604, supra note 22, at 22,
reprinted at 3923. See generally Hearings on S. 3197, supra note 36, at 212-13
(Memorandum to Hope Eastman, Associate Director, Washington Office ACLU,
from Robert Borosage, Director, Center for National Security Studies (June 4,
1976)). The aforementioned memorandum expressed concern about a noncriminal standard allowing surveillance of United States citizens engaged in lawful
activities.
98. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(1); see S. REP. No. 701, supra note 79, at 30, reprinted at 3999.
99. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5).
100. Id. § 1805(a)(4).
101. Id.
102. "United States persons" includes United States citizens and resident
aliens. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i); see S. REP. No. 701, supra note 79, reprintedat 4015-
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however, FISA contains two additional safeguards: the probable
cause finding may not be based solely upon activities which are
protected by the first amendment 03 and the required certifications must not be "clearly erroneous. "104 FISA also requires
yearly statistical reports to Congress' °5 and semiannual reports to
congressional committees on surveillance activities carried out
under FISA."'0
Although the primary purpose of FISA surveillance is the gathering of foreign intelligence information,01 Congress foresaw the
possible evidentiary use in criminal proceedings of FISA surveillances.108 FISA requires the Government to notify both the person against whom the evidence will be used 09 and the court in
which it intends to introduce the evidence.1120 The court must
then make a determination of the legality of the surveillance,
even if no motion to suppress has been made. 11 If the Attorney
General files an affidavit stating that an adversary hearing or disclosure of the evidence would jeopardize national security, then
the court must make an in camera, ex parte determination of the
legality of the surveillance, disclosing portions of the application,
order, and other materials "only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of surveillance. 11

2

The closed proceedings with discretionary disclosure are

Congress' attempts to strike a reasonable balance between a de16.
103. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
104. Id. § 1805 (a)(5). If the target of the surveillance is not a United States
person, the application must simply contain all the required statements and certifications. Id. The certifications establish that the information sought is foreign
intelligence information and that the information cannot reasonably be obtained
by normal investigative techniques. Id. § 1804 (a)(7)(E)(i)-(ii). If the target of
the surveillance is a "United States person," the FISA judge may also use as a
basis for concluding that the application is not "clearly erroneous" any other
information that he has required the applicant to furnish. Id. §§ 1804(1), (5),
1806(d).
105. Id. § 1807.
106. Id. § 1808.
107. S. REP. No. 701, supra note 79, at 9, reprinted at 3977-78.
108. 50 U.S.C. § 1806; see S. REP. No. 701, supra note 79, at 62, reprinted at
4031.
109. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 1806(f).
112. Id.
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fendant's constitutional right to defend himself and the government's need 3 to keep secret sensitive foreign intelligence
information.

11

III. THE
A.

CASES

United States v. Falvey

Charged with smuggling arms and equipment 14 to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland, defendants115
moved to suppress the fruits of electronic surveillance" 6 authorized under FISA after the Government moved for an order declaring the surveillance lawful.11 7 As part of a foreign counter-intelligence investigation into suspected international terrorist
activities in the New York area, 1 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) tapped 1 " the telephones of two of the defendants. 120
Following that surveillance, the Government, as required by
FISA,12 ' obtained the Attorney General's approval to use the information in a criminal proceeding and notified both the defendants and the instant court of its intent to use relevant tapes at
trial.

113.

22

After the Attorney General filed an affidavit alleging that

S. REP. No. 701, supra note 79, at 64, reprinted at 4033.

114. Defendants were charged with violations of 19 U.S.C. § 371 (1980)(conspiracy); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841-42, 5861, 5971 (purchase and use of firearms); and 22
U.S.C. § 2778 (1979)(control of arms exports and imports). Falvey, 540 F. Supp.
at 1307. On November 5, 1982, all defendants were acquitted on all charges.

115. Defendants were Thomas Falvey, George Harrison, Michael Flannery,
Patrick Mullin, and Daniel Gormley, all of Irish descent and all "active in the
cause of Irish unity." Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1307. For additional background
on these individuals, see Alexander, The Patriot Game, NEw YORK, Nov. 22,
1982, at 58-59; see also Capeci, Turning Tables on the CIA, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18,
1982, at 6.
116. Defendants moved under 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e) to suppress the evidence.
Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1308. The surveillance was applied for and approved
under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-05.
117. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1308; see supra text accompanying note 111.
118. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1308.
119. The surveillance was authorized on Apr. 3, 1981, and continued until
June 19 or 20, 1981. Id.
120. The telephones of Falvey and Harrison were tapped, intercepting conversations withFlann y and Gormley. Id. at 1310 n.10. All of the defendants
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).
122. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1308. The Government provided defendants
with logs of all the wiretaps but transcripts of only those conversations it
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disclosure
of this information would "harm the national secur' 123
ity,

the instant court granted an in camera, ex parte review of

the legality of the surveillance. 1 24 Defendants contended that the
surveillance was illegal because FISA is unconstitutional both on

its face and as applied. 25 Defendants argued that FISA does not
satisfy minimum fourth amendment standards1 28 and that FISA
was misused to obtain evidence in a routine criminal investigation. 2 7 Defendants also maintained that FISA does not adequately protect their first amendment rights because it is over-

broad and allows politically motivated surveillance.1 2 Defendants
further claimed that the secrecy of the in camera, ex parte review
violated their fifth amendment right to due process and their
sixth amendment rights to counsel, to confront witnesses, and to
a public trial. 2 9 The United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York granted the Government's motion to review
the legality of the surveillance, determined the surveillance legal,

and denied the motion to suppress.130 The district court acknowledged the instant case as one of first impression on the issue of
131
the FISA's constitutionality.

deemed relevant. Id.; see 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).
123. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1311; see 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f).
124. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1311.
125. Id. at 1308.
126. Id. at 1312. Defendants contend that the criminal probable cause standard of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Title m, is the constitutional minimum to which they are entitled. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1313. Title
III requires "probable cause" for belief that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a particular offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).
See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
127. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1313.
128. Id. at 1314-15.
129. Id. at 1315. Defendants also argued that the FISA violates the ninth
amendment and articles I and I of the Constitution, id. at 1308, but the court
dismissed those arguments in a footnote. See id. at 1313 n.16.
130. Id. at 1316.
131. Id. at 1309. On November 29, 1982, Judge Charles Sifton of the Eastern
District of New York issued a comprehensive opinion upholding FISA's constitutionality, both on its face and as applied. United States v. Megahey, CR-8200327 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1982). The opinion was in the process of being published at the time of this writing. The defendants in Megahey, United States
citizens and nonresident aliens charged with various firearms offenses as well as
conspiring to ship, and the transportation of, arms and munitions to the Irish
Republican Army, challenged FISA as unconstitutional under the first, fourth,
fifth, and sixth amendments as well as under article I of the Constitution, the
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The court divided defendants' constitutional arguments into
three groups. First, the court addressed the defendants' fourth
amendment arguments. Citing case law' 32 which supported the
validity of warrantless wiretapping for foreign intelligence purposes under the Executive's foreign affairs power, 33 the court
agreed with the three circuits that have accepted warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.134 The court
held, however, that the President is not entirely free of the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment and looked to
Keith 1 5 to define that reasonableness requirement in the context
of national security surveillance. 1 36 Defendants argued that they
were entitled to Title III warrant procedures as a constitutional
minimum.1 7 The district court responded that the Supreme
Court in Keith recognized as appropriate for national security
surveillances a probable cause standard "less precise" than Title
III's criminal standard, if the lesser standard was reasonable both
in relation to the Government's needs and the citizens' rights.138
The court found that because the Government has a clearly defined obligation to combat international terrorismP 9 and because
individual liberties are effectively protected by a judicial, rather
than an executive, probable cause determination,4 FISA met
Keith's reasonableness standards. The Court next responded to
separation of powers doctrine, and the political question doctrine. Id. at 2, 9-10.
The defendants also charged that FISA was unconstitutional as applied. Id. See
infra notes 186, 200, 203, 219 & 221.
See also In re Flanagan, 533 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (challenging the
definition of "aggrieved party").
132. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1311; see supra text acompanying notes 39-47.
133. Id.
134. Id. "When, therefore, the President has, as his primary purpose, the
accumulation of foreign intelligence information, his exercise of article H power
to conduct foreign affairs is not constitutionally hamstrung by the need to obtain prior judicial approval before engaging in wiretapping." Id.; see supranotes
39-47 and accompanying text.
135. 407 U.S. 297; see supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
136. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1311.
137. Id.; supra note 126.
138. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1312; see also supra text accompanying notes
30-38.
139. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1312-14. The court cites United States treaty
obligations to combat international terrorism. Id.
140. Id. at 1313; see supra text accompanying notes 94-103. The court dismissed two of the defendants' arguments questioning the function and effectiveness of the FISA judges. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1313 n.16; see supra note 129.
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defendants' argument that FISA was misused to obtain evidence
42
1 4 1 After reviewing Truong's1
in a routine criminal investigation.

holding that in order for evidence resulting from warrantless executive wiretapping to be admissible in a criminal proceeding, the
primary purpose of the surveillance must have been the acquisition of foreign intelligence information, the court distinguished
Truong because it involved a warrantless search.1 43 The court

then held the wiretapping evidence admissible because the FISA
warrant in the instant case had been lawfully obtained and because Congress in promulgating FISA anticipated the use of evidence seized pursuant to FISA at criminal proceedings. 4 ' Not
only was the authorization proper because of the on-going nature
of the foreign intelligence investigation but, the Court concluded,
the purpose of the surveillance was unquestionably to acquire for145
eign intelligence information.

Second, the court responded to defendants' first amendment
arguments. Answering defendants' charge that FISA allows politically motivated surveillance, the court held that FISA adequately
protects first amendment rights by (1) requiring a judge, not the
Executive, to make the probable cause finding that the target is
an agent of a foreign power, and (2) by providing that activities
protected by the first amendment cannot form the sole basis for
that determination. 4 The court found that the defendants' first
amendment rights were not violated because defendants' IRA activities were not protected by the first amendment.1 47 The court
also found FISA's provisions not overbroad because FISA's probable cause determination includes a finding that a target is involved in acts of international terrorism." 8
Last, the court answered defendants' charge that the in camera, ex parte review to determine the legality of the surveillance
violated their fifth amendment right to due process and their
sixth amendment rights to counsel, to confront witnesses, and to
141. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1313.
142. 629 F.2d 908; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.

143. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1314.
144. Id.

145. Id.
146. Id. at 1314-15; see supra note 103 and accompanying text.

147. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1314-15. The court took judicial notice of the
IRA's political purpose, then cited authority on its dual status as an interna-

tional terrorist organization. Id.
148. Id. at 1313; see supra text at notes 96-98.
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a public trial. 149 The court cited the "massive body" of case law,
5 1 and Ajlouny,152
including Giordano,150 Taglianetti,1
as supporting the proposition that the legality of electronic surveillance
should be determined on an in camera, ex parte basis when such
procedures adequately protect defendants' fourth amendment
rights.15 3 In addition, the court noted that in camera, ex parte
procedures have been upheld by the Supreme Court in areas

other than foreign intelligence based on the rationale that the
confrontation right does not apply to all pretrial hearings.5

Last,

the court, without explanation, cited a variety of cases to support
the statement that there is no absolute right to a public trial during pretrial suppression hearings. 5 5 The court concluded that

FISA is constitutional on its face and as applied, granted the government's motion to review the legality of the instant surveil-

lance, found that surveillance legal, and denied the defendants'
motion to suppress.1 5
B.

United States v. Belfield

On trial for charges'5 7 relating to the 1980 assassination of the
President of the Iran Freedom Foundation,'
appellants ap-

pealed the district court's finding 15 9 that electronic surveillances
149. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315.
150. 394 U.S. 310; see supra text at note 66.
151. 394 U.S. 316; see supra text accompanying note 68.
152. 629 F.2d. 830; see supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
153. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315.
154. Id. The court cited Manley, 632 F.2d 978 (in camera, ex parte hearing
to determine reliability of nondisclosed informants), and McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300, 314 (1967), and held that the sixth amendment does not preclude use
of testimonial privilege, nor mandate that informants appear to testify.
155. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315-16. The court cited Gannett, 443 U.S. 368,
see supra note 83-85 and accompanying text; Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, see supra note
73 and accompanying text; Dennis, 384 U.S. 855, see supra note 77 and accompanying text; Palermo, 360 U.S. 343, see supra note 73 & 74; Pelton, 578 F.2d
701, see supra note 73 & 74; and United States v. Buckley, 586 F.2d 498 (5th
Cir. 1978).
156. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1316.
157. Appellants, Horace Butler and Abdul-Mani, were charged with conspiracy to murder, accessory after the fact, grand larceny, unauthorized use of a
vehicle, and perjury. Belfield, 692 F.2d at 141-42.
158. Ali Akbar Tabatabai, President of the Iran Freedom Foundation, was
assassinated on July 22, 1980. Id. at 143.
159. On October 22, 1981, Judge Gasch of the United States District Court
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of them conducted by the Government under FISA were legal,
challenging the in camera, ex parte procedure used to determhine
legality.160 Prior to trial, appellants requested disclosure of any
electronic surveillance covering them; the Government responded
that each defendant had been overheard once incidentally during
the course of electronic surveillance authorized under FISA.161
The Government then submitted logs of the overhears to the Superior Court which, after an in camera examination, declared
them irrelevant, immaterial, and not discoverable. 62 According to
the Government, neither the surveillances nor any fruits of the
surveillances were used during the trial, but an in camera exhibit
did contain logs of the overhears, the FISA application with supporting papers, and the FISA court's orders. 63 Based on that exhibit, the Government petitioned the district court under FISA
for an ex parte determination of the legality of the surveillances. 6 The Attorney General filed a declaration stating that
disclosure would harm national security-appellants responded
by requesting disclosure and an adversary hearing.16 5 The district

court ruled in camera, ex parte that the surveillances were legal. 6' Appellants appealed the procedures used by the district
court, claiming that the failure to disclose the in camera exhibit
and the failure to allow an adversary hearing on the question of
legality was an abuse of discretion under FISA and, alternatively,
that the closed proceedings violated their fifth amendment due
process rights and their sixth amendment right to counsel.1 67 The

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court opinion, holding the court did not
abuse its discretion6 ' and that FISA's in camera, ex parte procefor the District of Columbia ruled the surveillances legal, based on papers filed
by the Government, the Government's in camera exhibit, and appellants' motion for disclosure and an adversary hearing. Id. at 144.
160. "Appellants are not directly challenging the legality of the surveillance.
Rather, they are seeking to participate in the determination of legality." Id.
161. Appellants were not the targets of the surveillance. Id. at 143.
162. On October 26, 1982, the court ruled under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), that the logs were not discoverable. Belfield, 692 F.2d at 143.
163. Belfield, 692 F.2d at 143.
164. The Government petitioned the court under 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). Id. at
143-44.
165. Id. at 144.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 147.
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dure was constitutional as applied.169
After reviewing the history of FISA, the court of appeals first
addressed appellants' statutory claims. Responding to appellants
argument that failure to disclose the in camera exhibit and hold
an adversary hearing was an abuse of discretion under Alderman,17 0 the court noted that (1) the language of section 1806(f)
clearly anticipates an in camera, ex parte determination of legality 71 and (2) the legislative history of that section sets forth examples of exceptional circumstances for which disclosure and an
adversary hearing may be necessary, none of which applied in the
instant case.17 2 Because there were no complicating considera-

tions, 173 because all statutory requirements had been met, and because disclosure would harm national security, the court con17 4
cluded the district court's action was not an abuse of discretion.
The court conceded, however, that if disclosure had been ordered,
75
appellants would have been entitled to an adversary hearing.
Appellants argued alternately that they were entitled to Title
III's mandatory disclosure provisions as a constitutional minimum.I76 The court responded by distinguishing Title III's pur-

pose-conducting criminal surveillance while protecting individual privacy rights-from FISA's purpose, gathering foreign
intelligence information while protecting both the national security and individual rights. 77 The court concluded that mandatory

disclosure is not constitutionally required because FISA protects
individual rights by expanded minimization procedures and an
in-depth oversight of FISA surveillance by all three branches of
169. Id. at 149.
170. 394 U.S. 165; see supra text at note 60.
171. Belfield, 692 F.2d at 147.
172. Exceptional circumstances noted by the court include possible misrepresentations, vague identifications, or possibly illegal surveillances. Id.
173. The court explicitly stated that the determination of legality of the 42page exhibit was not complex and that four judges, not including the FISA
judge, had agreed on the legality of the surveillance. Id.
174. "Indeed the surveillance is so clearly supported by the documents in the
Exhibit that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to

order disclosure." Id.
175. "[A]ppellants are correct that if disclosure were ordered, they would be
entitled to an adversary hearing." Id.
176. Id. at 148. Before the contents of a surveillance may be used in any
criminal proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 requires disclosure. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.

177. Id. at 148.
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government. 178 The court also cited pre-FISA precedent1 7 9 as supporting in camera, ex parte determinations of the legality of a
surveillance, particularly when the surveillance involves foreign
intelligence gathering. Commenting that FISA actually simplifies
a court's legality inquiry, 180 the Belfield court held the FISA's in
camera, ex parte provision constitutional in the instant case." 1

IV.
A.

ANALYsis

The National Security Exception

In mandating procedures for all foreign intelligence surveillance
within the United States, Congress refused to recognize any in-

herent power of the Executive to conduct warrantless national security surveillance 8 ' and intended to define, in combination with
Title III, the exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance could be conducted. 1 3 The Falvey court, in following
pre-FISA case law'8 4 and accepting FISA as a constitutional limitation on an inherent executive power rather than as a legislative
loosening of a universal constitutional restraint, undermined a

major purpose of FISA by leaving open the possibility of legal
warrantless national security surveillance outside of FISA. By endorsing an inherent executive power to conduct national security
surveillance,1 8 5 the Falvey court also revealed its opposition to a
strong judicial role in the authorization process. The court, for
178. For example, the Executive promulgates minimizations procedures, 50
U.S.C. § 1801(u)(i); the Judiciary rules on applications, 50 U.S.C. § 1805; and
Congress receives periodic reports on FISA surveillances, 50 U.S.C. § 1807-1808.
Belfield, 692 F.2d at 148 & n.34; see also supra text accompanying notes 92-106.
179. The court cited Zweibon, 516 F.2d 594; United States v. Lemonakis,
485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Ajlouny, 629
F.2d 830; Butenko, 494 F.2d 593; and Brown, 484 F.2d 418. Belfield, 692 F.2d at
149 & nn. 35-38; see supra text accompanying notes 71-72, 80-82. The court also
cited Giordano, 394 U.S. 310, and Taglianetti, 394 U.S. 316. Belfield, 692 F.2d
at 149 n.38; see supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
180. The court pointed out that prior to passage of FISA, courts had to determine whether surveillance fell within the President's inherent power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance; post-FISA courts need only decide
whether the application and order meets statutory requirements. Belfield, 692
F.2d at 149.
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying note 90.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
184. See supra notes 132 & 134 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 134.
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example, relegated to a footnote in its opinion the defendants' arguments that FISA judges may be acting in a less-than-judicial
capacity and may simply "rubber stamp" Executive determinations.18 6 The court failed to question the scope of the FISA
judges' probable cause determination 8 7 and simply accepted their
presence in the warrant process as an adequate safeguard against
an arbitrary Executive.
The Belfield court, which earlier in Zweibon had expressed
strong reservations about whether a national security exception
existed even in the context of foreign affairs, 8 8 did not address
this issue. 189
B.

The First Amendment

Because FISA protects "United States citizens" by prohibiting
186. See supra note 129. The Megahey opinion, see supra note 131, refutes
the defendants' article HI objections, pointing out that FISA judges make concrete decisions designed to protect individual's" privacy interests, and do not
simply issue advisory opinions or "rubber stamp" Executive determinations.
Megahey, CR-82-00327, at 42-44.
Critics have questioned whether FISA judges are acting in more of a clerical
and managerial than a judicial capacity and have characterized their determinations as advisory and possibly unconstitutional. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1566,
supra note 48 at 97 (statement by Professor Christopher Pyle); S. REP. No. 701,
supra note 79, at 92, reprintedat 4043 (views of Sen. Malcolm Wallop). On the
rubber stamp issue, see Hearings on S. 3197, supra note 36, at 213-14 (ACLU
memorandum). See generally Sharipo, supra note 2, at 190.
Recent Senate Reports show the following statistics:
Year
Applications
Orders Granting Authorization
1979
1980
1981

199
319
431

207* (none modified or denied)
322 (one modified)
433 (none modified or denied)

*one application can result in several orders
1979 figures from H. REP. No. 1466, 96th Cong., 2d Sess, 4 (1980); 1980 figures from S.
REP. No. 280, 97th Cong., lst Sess, 2 (1981); 1981 figures from a letter from Attorney
General William French Smith to Hon. Tfiomas F. O'Neill (Apr. 15, 1982).
187. See supra text and accompanying notes 94-96.
188. 516 F.2d at 613 & n. 42; see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
189. The issue was not raised by the Belfield appellants. In recounting the
history of FISA, however, the Belfield court noted that the several courts of
appeals had approved warrantless national security surveillance but that the
Circuit Court of the District of Columbia in Zweibon had suggested that the
national security exception may be unconstitutional. Belfield, 692 F.2d at 145 &
n. 15. For a summary of the Megahey court's treatment of the national security
exception, see infra note 203.
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a probable cause finding based solely on activities protected by
the first amendment, 1 0 the Falvey court was correct to examine
the activities justifying the FISA warrant. 191 Once again, however,
the court accepted the presence of a FISA judge as adequately
protecting the defendants from politically-motivated surveillance,
without questioning the "clearly erroneous" standard of judicial
review.""
In response to the challenge that FISA is overbroad, the Falvey
court noted the detail necessary to establish that a surveillance
target is an "agent of a foreign power." The court could have
strengthened its defense by evaluating FISA in terms of the Berger 93 particularity criteria adhered to by Congress in creating Title 111.114 The defendants in Belfield did not raise a first amend-

ment challenge.
C.

The Fourth Amendment

The fourth amendment challenge to FISA is the most critical,
as FISA's less-than-probable cause standard is central to attacks
on the statute. From FISA's inception, its most persistent critics
held out the specter of an intrusive search initiated on vague
grounds that would be used to produce evidence which could convict unfortunate citizens.19 5 In Falvey, the court simply adopted
the legislature's conclusion that Keith provides a satisfactory rationale for FISA, 196 accepted Keith as defining the limits of the
Executive's constitutional flexibility under the fourth amend190. See supra text accompanying note 104.
191. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
192. Critics have faulted FISA's "clearly erroneous" standard of review over
certifications regarding the purpose and necessity for FISA surveillance of
"United States persons." See generally S. REP. No. 701, supra note 79, at 54,
reprinted at 4023 (defending the standard of review). But see id. at 92, reprinted at 4044.

193. 388 U.S. 41.
194. The constitutionality of Title III was upheld on the basis of the Berger
criteria. See supra note 28. The ACLU in an amicus curiae brief challenged Berger on first amendment grounds. See supra note 25.
195. See Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 48, at 111 (ACLU statement);
Note, F.I.S.A.: Unconstitutional Warrant CriteriaPermit Warrant if a Possibility of International Terrorism is Found, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 963, 972
(1980). See generally Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 48; Hearings on S. 3197,
supra note 36.
196. Compare Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1312 with S. REP. No. 604, supranote
2, at 18, reprinted at 3919-20.
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ment, and easily found that FISA satisfies Keith's "reasonableness" standard. 197 The court did not address critics' concern that
Keith's less-than-probable cause standard is more appropriate for
a limited administrative search than for a highly intrusive electronic surveillance conducted with an eye toward possible criminal indictments. 19 Instead, in applying Keith's balancing of legitimate government interests against the protection of individual
rights, the court documented at length the self-evident conclusion
that combatting international terrorism is a legitimate goal of foreign intelligence surveillance19 and simply accepted the presence
of a FISA judge in the warrant process as adequately protecting
individuals from the potential arbitrariness of the Executive.0
In Falvey the defendants argued that their particular FISA surveillance should be subject to Truong's2 ° 1 "primarily for the purpose" test

2 2

and should be held illegal because the primary pur-

pose of the surveillance had shifted from foreign intelligence
gathering to a criminal investigation under which a Title III criminal warrant could have been obtained. When the court refused to
apply the Truong test and distinguished Truong as involving a
warrantless search, it forgot that the Truong surveillance was illegal because its purpose had clearly shifted from foreign intelligence surveillance to obtaining evidence in a criminal investigation, not because it was warrantless. Instead of examining the
197. See supra text accompanying note 34.

198. Keith's rationale is based on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967), which upheld a warrantless search by housing inspectors as reasonable in

light of the governmental interest in citizen health and safety. Id. at 535. The
appropriateness of applying the flexible probable cause standard of Camara to
criminal cases and to intrusive electronic surveillance was challenged by many
during the FISA hearings. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3197, supra note 36, at 210
(ACLU statement); Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 48, at 114 (ACLU statement). See generally Shapiro, supra note 2, at 154-55; Note, The ForeignIntel-

ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 13

VAND.

J. OF

TRANSNAT'L

L. 719, 749-51

(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, FISA].

199. See supra note 139.
200. The Megahey court, see supranote 131, held that the FISA warrant is a
constitutional warrant by fourth amendment standards, reasoning that under
Camara, 384 U.S. 523, the "reasonableness" standard for probable cause may

vary and an independent FISA judge applies FISA standards in a manner that,
although different from the standard civil or criminal warrant procedure, is
"reasonably adapted to the peculiarities of foreign intelligence gathering."
Megahey, CR-82-00327, at 24-28.

201. 629 F.2d 908.
202. Id. at 916; see supra text and accompanying notes 53-58.
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Falvey surveillance to determine if a similar shift had occurred,
the court adopted a per se rule: what begins as a legal FISA-warranted surveillance results in admissable evidence. 03 Unfortunately, what may be gained in judicial efficiency by the court's
approach could encourage precisely the abuse envisioned by the
FISA critics. In defense of the FISA's noncriminal warrant standard, the court could have made several stronger arguments: (1)
the probable cause standard for "an agent of a foreign power"
engaging in or preparing to engage in international terrorist activities is extremely close to a criminal standard; 0 4 (2) FISA's legitimate purpose of preventing international terrorist activities requires a more flexible probable cause standard than Title III's
criminal standard which seeks evidence that a crime has been, is
being, or is about to be committed;20 5 and (3) FISA authorizations
are not easier for the Government to obtain than Title III warrants but are in some respects more detailed and complicated.2 0
The fourth amendment issue was not raised by the Belfield
defendants.
D.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments

Both the Falvey and Belfield courts responded to defendants'
charges that FISA's in camera, ex parte legality determination
violated their constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth
amendments. The Falvey court, faced with extensive surveillance
203. The Megahey court, see supra note 131, took an entirely different ap-

proach. Because the Truong rationale was based on the Supreme Court's reason-

ing in Keith, Judge Sifton upheld FISA as meeting the limitations for a national
security exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement as articulated

in Truong. Judge Sifton reasoned that because Truong's "primarily for the purpose" test is implicit in FISA standards, FISA is constitutional on its face.

Megahey, CR-82-00327, at 21. Furthermore, because the Megahey surveillance,
based on Judge Sifton's in camera, ex parte review, was conducted primarily for

foreign intelligence purposes, the court found that FISA was constitutionally ap-

plied. Id. at 22. Importantly, Judge Sifton required the individual surveillance to

pass Truong's "primarily for the purpose" test. Id. at 17-24.
204. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 604,
supra note 2, at 47, reprinted at 3948.
205. S. REP. No. 604, supra note 2, reprinted at 3981. See also supra note

126.
206.

Compare, e.g., FISA's minimization procedures, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h), re-

quired for authorization under 50 U.S.C. § 1805(4), with Title III's vague minimization requirement, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). See generally Note, FISA, supra
note 195, at 740-43.
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to be used against defendants at trial, dismissed the challenge almost summarily; the Belfield court, faced only with limited surveillance not used as evidence in a criminal proceeding, examined
the constitutionality of the in camera, ex parte provision much
more thoroughly. The Falvey court upheld the lower court's legality determination without discussion and was equally unhelpful
in defending FISA's use of the closed proceedings. The court, for
example, erroneously cited Giordano20 7 and Taglianetti,208 among
others, as supporting the proposition that the legality of an electronic surveillance should be determined on an in camera, ex
parte basis. More accurately, these cases indicate that closed proceedings may be used if a defendant's fourth amendment rights
are not jeopardized, 20 1 an issue the Falvey court never considered,
despite citing Ajlouny for precisely that proposition. 2 10 The

court's bald statement that the sixth amendment's confrontation
right and the right to a public trial do not necessarily apply to
pretrial proceedings supplants what would have been a more
helpful balancing of the national interest in secrecy against the
defendants' need for disclosure and an adversary hearing to protect their constitutional rights.21' Instead, the court cited a string
of cases, 212 none of which involve the Government's need to protect foreign intelligence information and many of which involve
determinations less complex and less crucial to defendants' guilt
or innocence. The court never mentioned the obvious policy justification for closed proceedings-the need for the confidentiality
of intelligence information-nor did it discuss whether public
proceedings could have been detrimental to the defendant. In
short, the Falvey court simply "rubber stamped" FISA's in cam207. 394 U.S. 310.
208. 394 U.S. 316.
209. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315.
210. Belfield cited Giordano, Taglianetti, and Ajlouny, as supporting this
proposition. Ajlouny, also cited in Falvey, expressly recognized the unsettled
state of the law on the issue. See Ajlouny, 629 F.2d at 839 & n.12 (noting the
unsettled state of the law on in camera, ex parte hearings to determine the
legality of a surveillance). The Ajlouny court decided that an in camera, ex
parte legality determination would not jeopardize defendant's fourth amend-

ment rights because the determination was not complex, the surveillances did
not concern the subject matter of the indictment, and they were not used to

initiate the investigation that led to charges against the defendant. Id. at 838-39.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78; see also S. REP. No. 701,
supra note 79, at 55-56, reprinted at 3957.
212. See supra text and accompanying notes 150-53.
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era, ex parte provision.
The Belfield court, in upholding the lower court's legality determination, scrutinized the particular surveillance order not only
to determine whether the statutory requirements were met, but
also to determine whether any complicating considerations required disclosure or an adversary hearing to adequately protect
appellants' rights. 213 In rejecting appellants' argument under Alderman21 4 that determining the legality of any surveillance is too
complex for a closed proceeding, the Belfield court set precedent
by construing FISA's language and legislative history as envisioning closed proceedings to be the norm. At the same time,
however, the court left open the possibility that, in spite of national security interests, circumstances could require disclosure
and an adversary hearing.21 5 The Belfield court effectively defended FISA procedures against the argument that Title III's
mandatory disclosure provisions are a required constitutional
minimum by noting that (1) FISA and Title III have different
purposes and national security interests prevent ready disclosure
of FISA surveillances, (2) Congress took extra measures to protect
appellants' right by including participation of all three branches
of government in the FISA warrant process, and (3) FISA simplifies the determination of legality, making disclosure and an
adversary hearing less necessary to protect defendants' rights.2 16
Once again, in noting the defendants' "understandable reluctance" to be excluded from a process which "incidentially affected" them and by commenting that "this exclusion did not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation"2 17 (emphasis added), the
court left open the possibility that a more complex determination
or one more crucial to defendants' guilt or innocence determination could require open proceedings. In contrast to the Falvey
court, which asserted that in camera, ex parte proceedings should
be used to determine the legality of a surveillance, the Belfield

213. See supra text accompanying note 172.
214. 394 U.S. at 65. Belfield cited appellants' brief on this point. 692 F.2d at

147 & n.27. Alderman held that determining taint from an illegal surveillance is
a task too complex to rely on the in camera, ex parte judgment of the court.

Alderman, 394 U.S. at 192.
215. Belfield, 692 F.2d at 147.

216. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 701, supra note 79, at 65, reprinted at 4034

(recognizing that the Government may, in some instances, be forced to choose

between disclosure and prosecution).
217. 692 F.2d at 148.
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court took a much less categorical approach, citing similar case
law as standing for the proposition that open proceedings are not
constitutionally mandated as long as defendant's fourth amendment rights are protected.2 1 s In sum, instead of a blanket endorsement of FISA's in camera, ex parte provision, the Belfield
court indicated that in each case an ad hoc balancing of defendant's rights against the Government's interests should determine
whether the provision has been constitutionally applied.2 19
V.

CONCLUSION

Within its more limited scope, the Belfield decision provides a
helpful approach to FISA cases by articulating both a solid rationale for FISA's in camera, ex parte provision and a workable
balancing approach for determining whether open proceedings
may be necessary. The Falvey decision, although broader in
scope, does not provide a satisfactory rationale for FISA's deviation from the traditional fourth amendment warrant requirement,
nor does it articulate a workable approach to evaluating a FISAwarranted surveillance. The Falvey court, by predicating its upholding of FISA on an acceptance of the national security exception, may perpetuate a debate that the statute attempted to foreclose. For circuits that have not endorsed warrantless national
security surveillance by the Executive, the Falvey decision may
not offer a satisfactory rationale for accepting FISA's less-thanprobable cause standard. Furthermore, Falvey's substitution of a
per se rule for Truong's "primarily for the purpose" test may be
open to constitutional attack in the future.
The Falvey and Belfield decisions, along with the Truong foot-

218. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
219. In Megahey, see supra note 131, defendants also charged violation of
their sixth amendment rights to counsel, to a public trial, and to confront witnesses against them. Megahey, CR-82-00327, at 32. The Megahey court applied
the Ajlouny analysis-examining the surveillance to determine whether the in
camera, ex parte proceedings sufficiently protected defendants' fourth amendment rights. Id. at 34. Because the issues were not raised by defendants, the
court concluded that the closed proceeding did not violate defendants' constitutional rights. Id. at 34-35. The Megahey court, like the Belfield court, seemed to
suggest that in other circumstances, the closed proceeding may be inadequate:
"While the alert eye of an advocate might be helpful in discerning defects in the
certificates, I see no reason to believe that an adversary proceedings [in the instant case] is necessary for accuracy." Id. at 35.
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note,22° very likely foreshadow the deferential treatment that a
much-needed, complex, and extensively debated statute will receive in the courts. While the Belfield decision effectively defends
FISA's controversial in camera, ex parte provision, the Falvey
decision will disappoint both FISA's supporters and critics, who
will have to wait for a more satisfactory statement of their views
and a more convincing defense of FISA's controversial deviation
from traditional fourth amendment warrant requirements. 21
Judith B. Anderson

220. Truong, 629 F.2d at 914-15 n.4.
The Act teaches that it would be unwise for the judiciary, inexpert in
foreign intelligence, to attempt to enunciate an equally elaborate statement for the core of foreign intelligence surveillance under the guise of a
constitutional decision. Such an attempt would be particularly ill-advised
because it would not be easily subject to adjustment as the political
branches gain experience in working with a warrant requirement in the
foreign intelligence area.
221. The Megahey court provides a more satisfactory rationale for the judicial acceptance of FISA and for the manner in which FISA cases must be scrutinized. See supra notes 131, 186, 200, 203 & 219.

